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NOTES
CITY OF BURLINGTON V DAGUE-
CONTINGENCY ENHANCEMENT: THE
COURT BUCKLES UNDER THE
STATUTORY BURDEN
Litigating parties are generally responsible for the costs of their own attor-
neys.' However, to promote and strengthen the enforcement of individual
federal rights, to encourage private parties to seek relief, and to ensure that
private parties are able to afford and attract competent counsel, Congress
has approved a number of statutory exceptions to this general rule.2 As
such, federal fee-shifting statutes provide for an award of reasonable attor-
1. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 567 (1986) (affirming the practice
that "each party to a lawsuit ordinarily shall bear its own attorney's fees"); Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 561 (1986) [hereinafter Dela-
ware Valley 1] (same); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683-84 (1983) (same); Aly-
eska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 244 (1975) (same). The general
practice of not including attorney's fees as costs or as damages is known as the "American
Rule." See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247; Note, Awards of Attorneys'Fees to Unsuccessful Environ-
mental Litigants, 96 HARV. L. REV. 677, 678 (1983) [hereinafter Environmental Litigants];
James D. Weiss, Note, Nominal Damages, Nominal Victory: Estate of Farrar v. Cain's Im-
proper Limit on Awards ofAttorneys'Fees Under § 1988, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (1992).
In contrast, the "English Rule" regularly allows for the award of attorney's fees to successful
litigants. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247 n.18; Environmental Litigants, supra, at 678-79. See
generally Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929) (explaining the origins and
application of the "English Rule").
2. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 85 (1990) (noting that the goal of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 is to ensure that civil rights plaintiffs can obtain
competent counsel); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 95 (1989) (same); Delaware Valley I,
478 U.S. at 565 (finding that fee-shifting statutes are intended to ensure that private parties can
employ competent counsel); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (inter-
preting the fee award provision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Congress has
utilized fee-shifting statutes extensively in a variety of statutory contexts prior to and after the
Alyeska holding. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1141-42
(1991) (citing thirty-four fee-shifting statutes in ten titles of the United States Code). In Casey,
Justice Scalia noted that "[tihese statutes encompass diverse categories of legislation, including
tax, administrative procedure, environmental protection, consumer protection, admiralty and
navigation, utilities regulation, and, significantly, civil rights." Id. at 1142; see also Alyeska,
421 U.S. at 260-61 n.33 (listing specific fee-shifting statutes).
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ney's fees3 to prevailing parties4 in actions brought to vindicate designated
federal rights.5 By authorizing the award of attorney's fees, Congress ac-
knowledged that private enforcement is an essential step in the implementa-
tion of various statutory policies.6 Furthermore, Congress directed that
courts assess and apply twelve specific factors in calculating a reasonable
attorney's fee.7 Among these factors is the contingent nature of payment.'
In Hensley v. Eckerhart,9 the United States Supreme Court held that, in
appropriate cases, the contingent nature of payment may require enhance-
ment of an attorney's fee award in order to comply with the reasonable fee
standard.'0 In so doing, the Court has deferred to the statutory language
3. The specific language of individual statutes may vary, authorizing, for example, the
award of "costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees)," Solid
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act [herein-
after Clean Water Act], 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982), or the award of "a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs." Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b) (1988) [hereinafter Fees Awards Act].
4. Individual statutes may vary, authorizing, for example, the award of attorney's fees to
a "prevailing party," 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), or to a "prevailing or substantially prevailing
party," 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
5. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S.
711, 715 (1987) (plurality opinion) [hereinafter Delaware Valley II] (affirming the fee-shifting
principle that attorneys' fees are awarded to prevailing litigants enforcing certain federal
rights); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (same); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122,
127 n.9 (1980) (finding that a fee award encourages the vindication of constitutional rights
consistent with congressional intent); Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260 ("What Congress has done...
is to make specific and explicit provisions for the allowance of attorneys' fees under selected
statutes granting or protecting various federal rights.").
6. Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. 546, 560 (1986) (stating that the purpose of the fee-shift-
ing provision of the Clean Air Act and the Fees Awards Act is to "promote" private enforce-
ment of federal law); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 687 (1983) (noting that fee-
shifting provisions are intended to "encourage litigation... [and] assure proper implementa-
tion" of federal law); Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 262 (same).
7. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5908, 5913 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT] (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), as applying appropriate factors); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886, 892 (1984) (citing the factors listed in Johnson as those Congress intended to be used
in calculating fee awards); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 (same).
8. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718 (listing "[w]hether the fee is fixed or contingent" as one
of twelve factors to be considered in calculating a reasonable fee); see also SENATE REPORT,
supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913 (citing Johnson as containing fac-
tors necessary to calculate a reasonable fee). The contingent nature of payment, in its simplest
form, means that if the party prevails, the attorney will receive a fee; if the party does not
prevail, then the attorney will receive no compensation. See infra notes 196-202 and accompa-
nying text.
9. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
10. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 887 (finding that "an enhanced award may be justified 'in some
cases of exceptional success' "); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 n.9 (finding that the factors identified
in Johnson may be considered in calculating a fee award). But see Delaware Valley II, 483
U.S. 711, 727 (1987) (holding that the enhancement of the lodestar to account for risk of loss is
not permitted under general fee-shifting statutes).
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and legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976 (Fees Awards Act),II thus establishing that the analysis of this Act is
the standard by which all fee-shifting statutes are to be interpreted. 12 The
Supreme Court has also recognized that while the product of the reasonable
hours expended and a reasonable hourly fee, referred to as the lodestar,' 3 is
the appropriate starting point for calculating an attorney's fee award, other
considerations may require an upward or downward adjustment of the fee. 4
The Court, however, has disallowed enhancement of a fee award when en-
hancement amounts to compensation for factors already included in the as-
sessment of the reasonable fee.1'
The United States Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of
whether enhancement of a fee award based on the contingent nature of pay-
ment was appropriate' 6 until Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II). ' In Delaware Valley II, a four
Justice plurality of the Court held that enhancement for contingency is never
appropriate.'" The remaining five Justices, four in the dissent and one con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment, argued that contingency of pay-
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
12. See infra note 74 (citing cases establishing the primacy of the Fees Award Act); see
also City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2641 (1992); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,
463 U.S. 680, 691 (1983) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).
13. The product of the reasonable hours expended on litigation by an attorney and the
reasonable hourly rate charged by the attorney is known as the lodestar figure. This figure
represents an attempt by courts to simplify the method authorized in Johnson for calculating a
fee award. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text. However, the lodestar figure may
still be adjusted to account for the existence of one or more of the factors listed in Johnson.
See infra note 105 and accompanying text. In Dague, the Court addressed the issue of
whether the contingent nature of payment, a factor listed in Johnson, justified enhancing the
lodestar. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2640.
14. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 & n.9; see also Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (listing factors to be considered in setting a reason-
able fee); supra note 7.
15. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897-901 (1984). In Blum, the Supreme Court
rejected the district court's justification of an enhancement based upon "[t]he novelty and
complexity of the issues,' .... the quality of representation,'" and the "[riesults obtained," be-
cause these factors were subsumed within the calculation of the number of hours expended and
the reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 898-900.
16. The Blum Court, while not deciding the contingency issue, indicated in dictum that
enhancement based upon the contingent nature of payment was not appropriate in this partic-
ular case. Id. at 901 & n.17.
17. 483 U.S. 711 (1987) (plurality opinion). Delaware Valley II involved a suit brought
for violation of the Clean Air Act. The Court quoted the fee-shifting provision of the Act as
providing that " '[t]he Court ... may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the Court determines such award is appropri-
ate.'" Id. at 713 n.l (quoting Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1982)).
18. Id. at 725 (plurality opinion). Announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice White,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia, held that enhancement of a
fee award because of the risk of losing, and thus nonpayment, was inappropriate. Id.
1993]
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ment is a factor that should be considered in calculating an attorney's fee
award. 19 In 1992, the Supreme Court in City of Burlington v. Dague,20 re-
considered the issue of enhancement of an attorney's fee award based upon
the contingent nature of payment.2I
The Dague case originated as an action brought by local citizens against
the City of Burlington, Vermont for violations of federal and state statutes in
the operation of the Burlington Municipal Disposal Ground.22 The United
States District Court for the District of Vermont found that the city's opera-
tion of the landfill violated federal statutory provisions prohibiting open
dumping and the discharge of pollutants into United States waters.23 The
district court held that because the plaintiffs "substantially prevailed," they
were entitled to a fully compensatory attorney's fee award pursuant to the
fee-shifting provisions of the Clean Water Act and Solid Waste Disposal
Act.24 In calculating the fee award, the district court found that in order to
determine whether enhancement of the lodestar was appropriate, it must in-
quire into the difficulty the fee applicant would have encountered in ob-
taining counsel, if compensation for the contingent nature of payment had
19. Id. at 731-40. Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and concurring in judgment,
concluded that Congress did not prohibit the consideration of contingency when calculating a
reasonable fee. In the case under consideration, however, she felt that sufficient evidence did
not exist to support such an enhancement. Id. at 731 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Writing for
the dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, reached a
similar conclusion finding "that 'whether the fee is fixed or contingent' " was a consideration
in calculating a fee award and may, in appropriate cases, require enhancement of the award.
Id. at 736 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rules 1.5(a), 1.5(a)(8)).
20. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
21. Id. at 2639. The fee-shifting statutes considered by the Court included the Clean
Water Act and Solid Waste Disposal Act. Both provisions contain similar fee-shifting lan-
guage: "The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to this section,
may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any
prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines such award is ap-
propriate." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d)(1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1982); see Dague, 112 S. Ct. at
2640-41 (finding the statutory language similar).
22. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1346 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd in part, 112 S.
Ct. 964 (1992).
23. Id. at 1346-47. The city was found to have violated the open dumping provisions of
42 U.S.C. § 6945(a) (1982), provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1982) protecting against
danger "to health or the environment," and provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982 & Supp. III
1991), prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into a water-way. In Dague, the plaintiffs initi-
ated the action pursuant to the "citizen-suit" provisions of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982) (Solid Waste Disposal Act), and the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982). Dague, 935 F.2d at 1346. It is the fee-shifting language of these
statutes that provides for an attorney's fee award and the interpretation of these statutes by the
Supreme Court in Dague that form the basis of this Note.
24. See Dague v. City of Burlington, 733 F. Supp. 23, 25 (D. Vt. 1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d
1343 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
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not been available. 25 Having found that such difficulty would be present, the
court enhanced the lodestar figure by twenty-five percent to account for the
contingent nature of payment.26 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.2' The Second Circuit
held that the fee enhancement was not an abuse of discretion and that the
district court applied the appropriate standard to determine whether en-
hancement of the lodestar to reflect the contingent nature of payment was
proper.2
8
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, limiting the issue on
appeal to reconsideration of the appropriateness of enhancement of an attor-
ney's fee award based upon the contingent nature of payment. 29  The
Supreme Court reversed the holdings of the district court and the Second
Circuit, and held that enhancement was inappropriate under the fee-shifting
language at issue.3" The majority acknowledged that Supreme Court prece-
dent explaining the calculation of a reasonable fee award applied to all stat-
utes with similar fee-shifting language.31 However, the majority rejected the
respondents' argument that the lodestar should be enhanced to reflect the
contingent nature of payment in order to provide a reasonable fee award for
attorneys retained on contingency and to mirror the compensation available
25. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1360. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the proper inquiry was 'whether "[w]ithout the possibility of a fee enhancement...
competent counsel might refuse to represent clients thereby denying them effective access to
the courts.' "Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Eastman Kodak Co., 834 F.2d 295, 298 (2d
Cir. 1987)).
26. Id. at 1347. The twenty-five percent enhancement increased the fee award to
$247,534.37. Id.
27. Id. at 1360.
28. Id. The Second Circuit concluded that Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. 711 (1987), was
not controlling due to the Supreme Court's extreme division in that decision. Dague, 935 F.2d
at 1360. Accordingly, it determined that the question of contingency enhancement was open
and therefore controlled by the Second Circuit precedent of Friends of the Earth. Id.
29. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992) (granting certiorari). In granting
certiorari, the Supreme Court stated:
Petition for writ of certiorari ... granted limited to the following question: May a
court, in determining a reasonable attorney's fee award under Section 7002 of the
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 6972(e), or Section 505 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. Section 1365(d), enhance
the fee award above the lodestar amount in order to reflect the fact that the attorneys
had taken the case on a contingent-fee basis, thus assuming the risk of receiving no
attorney's fees at all?
Id.
30. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2643 (1992). A majority of six justices
reversed the Second Circuit's decision. Justices Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor dissented.
Id. at 2638-39.
31. Id. at 2641 (citing Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989) (super-
seded by statute)). The Court cited the Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as an example of a
statute where similar language required the same analysis. Id.
1993]
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in the private market.32 Instead, the Court determined that enhancement
for contingency would duplicate factors already considered in calculating
the lodestar, resulting in a prohibited "double-counting" and encouraging
attorneys to bring meritless claims. 33 In addition, the Court rejected the
approach espoused by Justice O'Connor in Delaware Valley 1J,34 reasoning
that Justice 0 Connor's approach was not capable of practical application. 35
In conclusion, the majority found that no other feasible basis could be
discerned from the language of fee-shifting statutes to restrict contingency
enhancement to less than all contingent-fee cases. 36 Therefore, the contin-
gency enhancement authorized in Dague was not appropriate under the fee-
shifting language at issue.37
In dissent, Justice Blackmun sharply criticized the majority's approach,
arguing that a fully compensatory fee consistent with that prevailing in the
market is necessary to effectuate the congressional purpose of fee-shifting
statutes.3' The dissent emphasized that the risk that should determine
whether enhancement is available is not the riskiness of a particular case, but
rather, "the risk of nonpayment associated with contingent cases considered
as a class.",39 Because the Court must look to fee practices available in the
32. Id. at 2641.
33. Id.
34. Id at 2642. Justice O'Connor's approach for determining whether enhancement for
contingency is required is based on whether the fee applicant "'would have faced substantial
difficulties'" in obtaining counsel absent enhancement for the contingent nature of payment,
rather than on the risk of not prevailing inherent in a particular case. Delaware Valley II, 483
U.S. 711, 731-34 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
35. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2642. The Dague Court reasoned that the Delaware Valley II
analysis could not "intelligibly be applied" given that the difficulty in finding counsel turned on
the riskiness or merit of a particular case-a factor that could not be considered under Justice
O'Connor's analysis. Id. In addition, the majority found Justice O'Connor's analysis in Dela-
ware Valley II lacking in that it relied on mimicking the market treatment of contingency cases
as a class when no true market existed and that any market that did exist was an imperfect
guide for determining a reasonable fee. Id. Furthermore, in cases involving injunctive or equi-
table relief, the majority argued that no market existed against which contingent cases could be
compared. Id. To the extent that a market does exist, the Court argued that it was created by
fee-shifting statutes and that therefore, any reference to it to determine a reasonable award
would be circular. Id.
36. Id. at 2642-43.
37. Id. at 2643-44. The Court cited "a number of reasons for concluding that no contin-
gency enhancement whatever is compatible with the fee-shifting statutes at issue." Id. at 2643.
Specifically, in support of its position against contingency enhancement under fee-shifting stat-
utes, the Court pointed to the language of the statute, its rejection of the contingent fee model
in the past, and the administrative difficulties that would result from enhancement of a fee
award based upon contingency. Id.
38. Id. at 2644 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that the purpose of
fee-shifting statutes was to "strengthen the enforcement of selected federal laws by ensuring
that private persons seeking to enforce those laws could retain competent counsel." Id.
39. Id. at 2645.
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private market when it sets the lodestar, Justice Blackmun reasoned that it
should also look to the market when assessing the appropriateness of contin-
gency enhancement.' The dissent concluded that consideration of the con-
tingent nature of payment when calculating a reasonable fee would achieve
administrative efficiency through the adoption of a model similar to the Del-
aware Valley II concurrence. Justice Blackmun argued that such a model
would settle the standards courts must apply in calculating a reasonable fee
and in determining whether enhancement of the lodestar for contingency is
appropriate.4
1
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that a reason-
able fee must be sufficient to "attract competent counsel," requiring, in some
instances, an enhancement above the lodestar figure for the contingent na-
ture of payment.42 Justice O'Connor, therefore, rejected the majority's posi-
tion that a fee award can never be enhanced for contingency and reaffirmed
her approach in Delaware Valley II, basing enhancement on the relevant
market treatment of contingent cases as a class rather than on individual
case factors.43 In conclusion, although acknowledging the difficulty of as-
sessing the appropriate market, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's
rejection of contingency enhancement due to the "difficulty of the task" and
agreed with Justice Blackmun that a contingency assessment would be sim-
plified once appropriate markets became settled."
This Note examines the enhancement of attorney's fee awards based upon
the contingent nature of payment. It first traces the development of federal
fee-shifting statutes from the common law tradition of equitable attorney's
fee awards. This Note then examines the purpose of these statutes based on
factors employed to calculate a reasonable attorney's fee award. It also dis-
cusses the Supreme Court's decision in Delaware Valley II, setting out the
dichotomy of positions on the appropriateness of contingency enhancement.
Next, this Note analyzes the United States Supreme Court's decision in City
of Burlington v. Dague45 in light of the legislative history and established
Supreme Court precedent for interpreting the language of federal fee-shifting
statutes. This Note argues that the majority's holding in Dague establishes a
subtle break with Supreme Court precedent and runs contrary to the legisla-
tive purpose of fee-shifting statutes by sacrificing a greater statutory purpose
40. Id. at 2647.
41. Id. "[I]f Justice O'CONNOR's standard were adopted, the matter of the amount by
which fees should be increased would quickly become settled .... " Id.
42. Id. at 2648 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
43. lId
44. Id. Citing Justice Blackmun's dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that "these initial hur-
dles would be overcome as the enhancements appropriate to various markets became settled."
Id.
45. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
1993]
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for administrative efficiency. Finally, this Note suggests that by ignoring the
contingent nature of payment in calculating an attorney's fee award, the
Court has limited the effectiveness and enforcement of important civil rights
and environmental laws, thus hindering the essential private prosecution of
these laws and inviting congressional overruling of its decision.
I. EXCEPTIONS TO THE AMERICAN RULE: THE NEED FOR PRIVATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL
In general, fee-shifting statutes provide that the prevailing litigant's attor-
ney's fee will be shifted to the losing litigant in the payment of damages.46
The right to recover these fees, however, is conferred on the prevailing party,
not the party's attorney. 47 Most fee-shifting statutes also limit an award to
parties who have "'prevailed,'" or " 'substantially prevailed,' , basing the
determination of prevailing status on the individual results and merits of
each case.49 While the rights these statutes confer vary greatly, any award in
contradiction to the traditional "American Rule" must uniformly represent
a reasonable fee." °
46. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 276 n. 1(1989) (applying the Fees Awards
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1988)); Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. 711, 715 (1987) (apply-
ing the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1982 & Supp. 11 1990); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 426 (1983) (applying the Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)); Alyeska Pipe-
line Sery. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260-61 (1975) (interpreting the Mineral Leas-
ing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1982), and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370 (1982)).
47. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1990) (applying the Fees Awards Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730 (1986) (superseded by statute)
(same); Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What Is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 281, 303-04 (1977); see also Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. 546, 557 (1986) (explaining
that under the Clean Air Act, attorney's fees may be awarded to any party); Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984) (stating that under the Fees Awards Act, the award of attorney's fees
is to the prevailing party); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 426 (same); Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 261 (explain-
ing that the award of attorney's fees is to be made to the prevailing party under general fee-
shifting statutes); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 675 (1982) (supporting the proposition that a party is awarded
attorney's fees to indemnify him for the cost of employing an attorney); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 353 (1980) (explaining that "'the prevailing party,'" either plaintiff or
defendant, may be compensated for attorney's fees under Fees Awards Act).
48. Berger, supra note 47, at 304-05.
49. Id. at 305. The term 'prevailing party' " was originally interpreted to require signifi-
cant success on the litigant's " 'central issue.'" Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688
(1983). Therefore, inclusion of the terms "substantially prevailing" and "partially prevailing"
permits courts to award attorney's fees to claimants who have achieved only limited success or
only prevailed in part. Id.
50. See Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 561-62. "There are over 100 separate statutes
providing for the award of attorney's fees; and although these provisions cover a wide variety
of contexts and causes of action, the benchmark for the awards under nearly all of these stat-
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A. Limiting the Equitable Exceptions: The Role of Statutory
Attorney's Fee Awards
Traditionally, American courts do not provide for the recovery of attor-
ney's fees within damage awards.5" Rather, each litigating party must bear
the cost of an attorney. 2 This limitation, known as the "American Rule," is
contrasted by the "English Rule," which routinely grants attorney's fees
along with an award of damages. 3 The United States Supreme Court has
consistently reaffirmed the American Rule.5 4 In spite of this traditional lim-
itation, however, American courts have recognized specific situations in
which equity demands that courts shift the cost of attorney's fees from one
litigant to another.5
One recognized situation in which courts have determined that equity de-
mands fee-shifting occurs when a prevailing litigant benefits a class or cre-
ates a fund from which a particular class may recover.56 In this situation,
courts exercise their equitable power to prevent those who benefit from the
utes is that the attorney's fee must be 'reasonable.'" Id at 562; see also Berger, supra note 47,
at 305 (finding that fee-shifting statutes provide for the award of a "'reasonable' " fee).
51. See, e.g., Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 249 (citing Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796)).
In Arcambel, the Supreme Court rejected requests to create a judicial rule authorizing the
award of attorney's fees, stating that "[t]he general practice of the United States is in oposition
[sic] to it." Arcambel, 3 U.S. at 306.
52. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247. "In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily
not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser." Id.; see also supra note 1
(citing cases affirming the American Rule).
53. The English authorization for fee awards is by statute. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247.
Under English common law, such awards were prohibited. Id.; see also Environmental Liti-
gants, supra note 1, at 678.
54. See, e.g., Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 561 (same); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477
U.S. 561, 567 (1986) (reaffirming the "'American Rule' that.., each party to a lawsuit ordi-
narily shall bear its own attorney's fees"); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683-84
(1983) (same); Alyeska, 241 U.S. at 249-50 (supporting the American Rule and citing cases
affirming it); F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 126-31 (1974) (affirming the Ameri-
can Rule); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967)
(same); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 191-96 (1879) (same).
55. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257-59 (examining situations in which application of court's
equitable powers provide for an exception to the American Rule); see also F.D. Rich, 417 U.S.
at 129 (affirming the equitable principle that attorney's fees may be awarded in response to bad
faith); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973) (superseded by statute) (supporting use of equitable
power to award attorney's fees in contrast to the American Rule); Fleischmann Distilling
Corp., 386 U.S. at 718 (affirming the equitable principle that attorney's fees may be awarded in
response to the violation of a court order); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 165-
66 (1939) (supporting the equitable principle that a party creating a common fund may recover
attorney costs); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1881) (same); Berger, supra note
47, at 295-303 (commenting on Alyeska's confrontation of the equitable exception to the
"'American rule' ").
56. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 245 (explaining the application of the "common benefit"
rule); see also Berger, supra note 47, at 295-96; Environmental Litigants, supra note 1, at 679-
80 (explaining the unjust enrichment justification for the common benefit rule). The prevailing
1993]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 42:615
litigation from being unjustly enriched at the expense of the acting litigant."
In addition, courts have found that equity may demand fee-shifting against a
party conducting bad-faith litigation.58 A third exception, the private attor-
ney general doctrine, shifts the cost of attorney's fees to the losing litigant,
encouraging private parties to bring suit and thereby ensuring enforce-
ment."9 This exception is based on the principle that litigating parties, act-
ing in the role of private attorneys general, who successfully enforce
important statutory rights, benefit the public and ensure that governmental
statutory schemes are effectivly enforced.'
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,6 1 the Supreme Court
strictly limited situations in which federal courts may exercise their equita-
ble fee-shifting power.62 Specifically, the Court restricted the use of the pri-
vate attorney general doctrine to cases in which Congress has specifically
mandated that the losing party bear the cost of the prevailing party's attor-
ney's fees.6" In its decision, the Court noted that the numerous statutes pro-
viding for the award of attorney's fees depend heavily on private action to
ensure their enforcement and the attainment of their desired policy goals.
64
party may recover attorney's fees from either the class or the fund. Berger, supra note 47, at
295-96.
57. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 244. "[T]he 'common benefit' exception ... spreads the cost of
litigation to those persons benefiting from it ...." Id. ; see also Environmental Litigants, supra
note 1, at 679 n. 10 (citing Greenough, 105 U.S. at 527, as the first case employing the common
benefit rationale to allow a prevailing party to recover attorney's fees).
58. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258-59; see also Berger, supra note 47, at 302. Bad faith is usu-
ally exemplified by obstructive or oppressive action during litigation or by conduct in direct
violation of a court order. The rationale behind the bad faith principle is to deter parties from
violating or disregarding action of the court and to punish those parties engaging in such
action. See Berger, supra note 47, at 302. Therefore, the affected party's attorney's fee is
shifted to the party who acted in bad faith. See Hall, 412 U.S. at 4-5.
59. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 245-46. In Alyeska, the prevailing party asserted that it was
entitled to an attorney's fee award because it had "acted to vindicate 'important statutory
rights of all citizens,'" and "ensured that the governmental system functioned properly." Id.
at 245. The parties argued that an award of attorney's fees was necessary to ensure that pri-
vate parties would bring actions to enforce environmental laws. Id.
60. See Environmental Litigants, supra note 1, at 679.
61. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
62. Id. at 269 (denying a request by the prevailing environmental litigants for attorney's
fees under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, based on the lack of congressionally authorized fee-shifting provisions in these statutes);
see also Berger, supra note 47, at 295. The Alyeska Court limited the use of equitable fee-
shifting power to the traditional common benefit and bad faith exceptions. Alyeska, 421 U.S.
at 258-61. The "private-attorney-general" rationale was specifically limited to situations in
which Congress had authorized fee-shifting. Id. at 269-70; see Environmental Litigants, supra
note 1, at 680.
63. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260.
64. Id. at 263. "It is true that under some, if not most, of the statutes providing for the
allowance of reasonable fees, Congress has opted to rely heavily on private enforcement to
implement public policy and to allow counsel fees so as to encourage private litigation." Id.;
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The Court explained that Congress reserved for itself the role of determining
when and under what circumstances a fee award would be available, thus
limiting the power of federal courts to award attorney's fees absent statutory
authorization.65 The Alyeska decision not only reaffirmed the American
Rule, but also expressly recognized the exclusive power of Congress to set
policy and determine which statutes require fee awards to encourage private
actions essential to furthering that policy.
66
B. Response to Alyeska" The Nuts and Bolts of Fee-Shifting
In several statutory schemes, Congress has authorized the award of attor-
ney's fees for suits brought to enforce federal rights.67 The lack of legislative
guidance as to what standards determine a reasonable fee award has led
some commentators to suggest that the only common element in determin-
ing what is reasonable is the lack of any uniform standard.68 In response to
Alyeska, however, Congress endorsed a group of cases in the legislative his-
tory of the Fees Awards Act that established standards for determining a
reasonable fee.69 Congress determined that a successful plaintiff should be
see also Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (finding private litigation an
essential means to enforce Title II civil rights law).
65. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 263-69.
66. Id. at 271. The Alyeska Court held that courts should not "invade the legislature's
province by redistributing litigation costs." Id.
67. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 44-51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing over
100 fee-shifting statutes); Berger, supra note 47, at 303 n. 104 (citing seventy-five statutes with
fee-shifting provisions); Environmental Litigants, supra note 1, at 680 & n.21 (citing fee-shift-
ing statutes).
68. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 47, at 283-84 (noting that "there are nearly as many
approaches to the issue as there are judges"); Don Corson, Note, Attorney Fees and the Con-
tingency Factor Under 42 US. C. § 1988: Blum v. Stenson, 465 US. 886 (1984), 64 OR. L.
REV. 571, 571 (1986) (noting the "inconsistent opinions" among federal courts regarding the
determination of attorney's fee awards); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal
Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 701-05 (1974) [hereinafter Equal Access] (com-
menting on the variety of approaches and the lack of a uniform approach regarding the deter-
mination of a reasonable fee); James D. Kole, Comment, Nonpayment Risk Multipliers:
Incentives or Windfalls?, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 1074, 1076 (1986) (commenting on the variety of
approaches in federal courts regarding the calculation of attorney's fee awards). See generally
John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473 (1981)
(explaining the variety of approaches for calculating an attorney's fee award when compensat-
ing for the contingent nature of payment).
69. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913.
The 1976 Senate Report cited Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1974), as establishing the proper standards for determining a reasonable fee, and Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975), Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), and Van Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D.
9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974), as properly applying the standards for determining a reasonable fee.
See Corson, supra note 68, at 574 (citing the Senate Report accompanying the Fees Awards
Act as providing the "framework" for calculating a fee award).
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awarded attorney's fees provided that such an award would not be "un-
just."7 As a general guide, the fee award must be sufficient to ensure that
litigants can obtain "competent" council.71 As such, the award should rep-
resent the amount that the attorney would expect to receive for his services
from a fee-paying client in a private action.72 The Supreme Court has also
acknowledged that these principles, along with the standards suggested in
the legislative history of the Fees Awards Act, serve as the basis for deter-
mining a reasonable attorney's fee and for ascertaining the purpose of fee-
shifting statutes in general.73 This analytical basis provides the starting
point upon which all subsequent fee-shifting analyses and case law are
based."'
C. Fee-Shifting: Purpose and Standards
The presence of fee-shifting provisions in statutory enactments is a reflec-
tion of a congressional determination that private enforcement is essential to
full implementation of and compliance with the law.75 Fee-shifting recog-
nizes that the availability of an attorney's fee award is necessary to ensure
private enforcement.76 In the most basic sense, fee-shifting provisions ac-
knowledge that if private litigants are to be encouraged to bring enforcement
70. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5912.
71. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913.
72. Id. The compensation must further be based on "all [the] time reasonably expended
on a matter," Van Davis, 8 E.P.D. at 9444; Stanford Daily, 64 F.R.D. at 684, thus preventing
any "windfalls to attorneys." SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913.
73. See, e.g., Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S 546, 560 (1986) (finding that the attorney's fees
provision of the Clean Air Act had a similar purpose to that of the Fees Awards Act, and
therefore, should be interpreted in a similar manner).
74. See, e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2639 (1992) (holding that the
calculation of an attorney's fee award under federal fee-shifting statutes is governed by the
Supreme Court's treatment of the Fees Awards Act); Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 556, 560.
In Delaware Valley I, the Supreme Court held that in an action for attorney's fees under the
Clean Air Act, "the jurisprudence regarding the calculation of reasonable attorneys fees devel-
oped in connection with other attorney fees statutes-particularly 42 U.S.C. § 1988-is appli-
cable in cases brought pursuant to [the Clean Air Act]." Id. at 560 (quoting Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 478 U.S. 546 (1986), rev'd, 483 U.S. 711 (1987)); see also Hensley v. Eck-
erhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983) (holding in a case requesting attorney's fees under the
Fees Awards Act that "[t]he standards set forth in [the] opinion are generally applicable in all
cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a 'prevailing party' ").
75. See Berger, supra note 47, at 306; see also Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S.
400, 401 (finding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 relied on private litigation to ensure en-
forcement).
76. See Berger, supra note 47, at 306. "The statutes are premised upon the proposition
that private enforcement is essential to the effectuation of the substantive statutory scheme and
that the award of attorneys' fees is essential to effective private enforcement." Id.
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actions, they must be able to recover the costs of bringing such actions."'
Congress, however, did not intend this encouragement to be a mere token
gesture.
It is Congress's intent that fee awards serve as a "remedy," ensuring that
citizens proceeding as private attorneys general have a "meaningful opportu-
nity" to enforce the law and thereby help effectuate congressional policy.78
In many situations, however, private fee arrangements prove insufficient to
encourage effective enforcement because few injured parties can shoulder the
cost of litigation.79 In this sense, statutory fee awards are designed to fully
compensate attorneys for time reasonably expended on litigation, thus at-
tracting competent counsel to represent citizens acting to facilitate compli-
ance with statutory policies."0 The legislative history accompanying the
Fees Awards Act points to a group of cases in which the fee award analysis
fulfills the dual statutory goals of compensating prevailing counsel at rates
on par "with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client"8" and attracting
competent counsel with fully compensatory fees.82
The talisman of a fully compensatory fee sufficient to attract competent
counsel is the "reasonable fee." 83 Congress provided that a reasonable attor-
ney's fee should be calculated based upon consideration of the twelve factors
set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 84 However, these
twelve factors proved to be an impractical framework for calculating a rea-
77. Id. If private parties were forced to bear their own costs, many injured parties would
not be in a financial position to mount enforcement actions. See Newman, 390 U.S. at 401.
78. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910.
79. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 578 (1986). Congress recognized that pri-
vate-sector fee arrangements were inadequate to ensure sufficiently vigorous enforcement of
civil rights. Id.
80. See id.; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5913 (listing cases providing a fee compensating attorneys for reasonable time).
81. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913.
82. See Berger, supra note 47, at 306.
83. See Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. 546, 562 (1986) (describing the reasonable fee as the
"benchmark" of fee-shifting statutes).
84. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The twelve-factor framework included the following:
(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions, (3) the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the
attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys,
(10) the "undesirability" of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client, (12) and awards in similar cases. Id. at 717-19. These basic factors are
modeled upon the American Bar Association's guidelines for private fee setting. See Berger,
supra note 47, at 306.
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sonable fee.85 When applied, some factors proved duplicative86 and it re-
mained unclear which factors should receive a higher degree of scrutiny. 87
Consequently, the checklist led to varying and inconsistent determinations
of what constituted a reasonable fee.88
II. CALCULATING THE REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE
The lodestar approach, the product of the reasonable number of hours
expended on litigation and a reasonable hourly fee, was developed to bring
consistency and simplicity to the fee calculation analysis.8 9 However, even
this simple formula required explanation. Specifically, it was unclear not
only what constituted reasonable hours and a reasonable fee, but also where
a court might look for instruction on the reasonableness of these elements."°
The United States Supreme Court answered these questions in Hensley v.
85. See Berger, supra note 47, at 285; Corson, supra note 68, at 574; see also SENATE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913 (setting out the frame-
work for calculating a reasonable fee).
86. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc). "Simply to
articulate those twelve factors, however, does not itself conjure up a reasonable dollar figure in
the mind of a district court judge. A formula is necessary to translate the relevant factors into
terms of dollars and cents." Id. at 890; see also Berger, supra note 47, at 286 (stating that the
Johnson factors are "partially redundant"); Corson, supra note 68, at 575. As an example of
the Johnson factors' redundancy, the "time and labor required" is said to be reflected in the
novelty and complexity of the issues in a particular case because the more complex and novel
the issues, the more time it will take to resolve them. See Copeland, 641 F.2d at 889; Berger,
supra note 44, at 286 n.26. Accounting for both in a fee award would be duplication.
87. Corson, supra note 68, at 575. The test resulted in awards by courts with only "con-
clusory" reference to the Johnson factors, and without any explanation as to how these factors
were weighed. See Berger, supra note 47, at 286.
88. See Copeland, 641 F.2d at 890 (commenting on appellate court recognition of the
Johnson factors' imprecision). The inconsistent treatment of the Johnson factors by federal
courts is highlighted by the treatment of the contingent nature of payment. Some courts re-
quire that a contingent agreement between attorney and client exist in order to account for the
contingent nature of payment, while others recognize the contingent nature of payment when-
ever payment was not certain. See Berger, supra note 47, at 285-87 & n.21-27 (detailing the
divergent treatment of the Johnson factors by federal courts); compare Lindy Bros. Builders v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976) with Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974). One commentator has
noted that:
The fundamental problem with an approach that does no more than assure that the
lower courts will consider a plethora of conflicting and at least partially redundant
factors is that it provides no analytical framework for their application. It offers no
guidance on the relative importance of each factor, whether they are to be applied
differently in different contexts, or, indeed, how they are to be applied at all.
Berger, supra note 47, at 286-87.
89. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
90. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894-96 (1984) (explaining the reasonable fee prong
of the lodestar); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-40 (1983) (explaining the reasonable
hours prong of the lodestar).
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Eckerhart,9 1 addressing the reasonable hours issue,92 and Blum v. Stenson ,9
addressing the reasonable fee issue. 94 Nevertheless, questions remained as to
which of the Johnson factors were already accounted for within the lodestar
and which could be examined to enhance the lodestar figure.
95
A. Uniform Calculation: The Lodestar
The lodestar approach for calculating an attorney's fee reduces the cum-
bersome application of the Johnson standards by providing a uniform frame-
work that incorporates several of the Johnson factors. 96 First, a court
determines the number of hours reasonably expended by an attorney in con-
nection with an action.97 Second, it determines the reasonable value of these
hours based on an appropriate hourly billing rate.98 The product of these
two figures constitutes the foundation of the court's fee award.99
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pioneered the
lodestar approach in Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp. "00 The court in Lindy Brothers, however, viewed
the lodestar figure simply as an objective base upon which to determine a
reasonable fee. 101 According to the Third Circuit, it was necessary to deter-
91. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
92. Id. at 433-40.
93. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
94. Id. at 894-96.
95. See infra notes 119-44 and accompanying text (discussing enhancements of the
lodestar).
96. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34 (adopting the lodestar approach whereby application
of the Johnson factors is partially replaced by a calculation of the reasonable hours expended
on litigation and the reasonable hourly rate, thus providing for "an objective basis on which to
make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services"); Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 373
(citing the Third and District of Columbia Circuits' adoption of the lodestar formula to sim-
plify the calculation of attorney fee awards from the method supported by Johnson); see also
supra note 13 (explaining the lodestar formula).
97. See Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 373. The appropriate hourly rate is determined by
examining those hours that qualify for calculation. Hours must first be connected with a claim
on which the party prevailed. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Next, the hours must be reasonable, a
term defined as not "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Id. at 434. " '[B]illing
judgment'" must then be exercised, and overstaffing and inappropriate billing must be ex-
amined to determine if all hours expended are reasonable. Id. (quoting Copeland v. Marshall,
641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc)).
98. Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 373. The hourly billing rate is determined by examining
the hourly rates available in the local market which are applicable to the situation being ex-
amined. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.l (1984).
99. Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 373.
100. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (addressing the calculation of an award of attorney's fees
in a class action brought for the violation of antitrust laws).
101. Id. at 168 (stating that the product of the reasonable hours and hourly fee is the
"lodestar," the base of a court's fee calculation; other factors must also be considered after this
initial calculation).
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mine the existence of two additional factors in order to attain the true value
of the attorney's services: the contingent nature of success, namely that pay-
ment was not guaranteed; and the quality of the attorney's work."12
1. The Calculation of Reasonable Hours
The United States Supreme Court adopted the Third Circuit's lodestar
approach in Hensley v. Eckerhart. o3 The Court established the lodestar fig-
ure as the starting point from which attorney's fees were to be calculated. "o
In addressing the reasonable hours issue, however, the Hensley Court specifi-
cally limited the number of hours that could reasonably be considered and
suggested that not all of the twelve Johnson factors were appropriate for
consideration.' 5 Hensley modified the lodestar approach by limiting the
hours included in the calculation to only those hours "reasonably expended"
and, of these hours, only those expended in connection with claims on which
the party actually prevailed or that were connected with prevailing
claims. °6 Limiting consideration to hours reasonably expended filtered out
duplicative or wasteful hours, demanding the same accountability attorneys
face when billing a client in the private sector.' °7 Refusing to compensate
attorneys for hours spent on unsuccessful claims corresponded with congres-
sional requirements that awards were limited to prevailing parties.' 8 In
102. Id. at 168; see also Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976) (allowing an enhancement of the lodestar based
on the contingent nature of payment and results obtained). As in Lindy Bros., the Supreme
Court supported consideration of other factors after the initial lodestar calculation in Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 & n.9 (1983).
103. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (stating that the "starting point for determining... a reason-
able fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reason-
able hourly rate"). The lodestar approach that the Supreme Court adopted in Hensley was not
as expansive as that used in Lindy Bros.; it sought to tighten up the factors included in a fee
calculation. See Corson, supra note 68, at 575.
104. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (addressing request for attorney's fees under the Fees
Awards Act by prevailing civil rights litigants).
105. Id. Attorneys were expected to provide proof of hours reasonably expended and exer-
cise the same "'billing judgment'" that would be required in private litigation. Id. at 434
(quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc)). "[E]xcessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" hours were considered unreasonable. Id.; see also Cor-
son, supra note 68, at 575 & n.32.
106. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435-37. Through this action, the Court answered the suggestion
in Lindy Bros. that all hours reasonably spent by an attorney could be included in the lodestar.
Id.
107. Id. at 434. " 'In the private sector, "billing judgment" is an important component in
fee setting. It is no less important... [in calculating fee awards]. Hours that are not properly
billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary pursuant to statutory au-
thority.'" Id. (quoting Copeland 641 F.2d at 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (emphasis in
original)).
108. Id. at 435.
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making this distinction, however, the Supreme Court acknowledged that in
some cases an unsuccessful claim may be based on a "common core of facts"
or otherwise related to a prevailing claim, such that consideration of those
hours may be required."°9 The Court, therefore, rejected a simple "'mathe-
matical approach' " of subtracting unsuccessful claims from the total
number of issues presented because it did not allow for the consideration of
all relevant factors.' 10
2. The Reasonable Hourly Fee
While Hensley dealt with the calculation of a reasonable number of billa-
ble hours, Blum v. Stenson .. addressed the second prong of the lodestar
calculation-the hourly rate.' 12 In Blum, the Supreme Court established
that a reasonable hourly rate is measured by the rate prevailing in the rele-
vant local market." 3 The Court recognized that an attorney's hourly rate
will vary based on "skill, experience and reputation.""' 4 Furthermore, it
noted that an attorney's fee is usually the product of negotiation with the
client based on the premise that, win or lose, the attorney will be paid.' 15
This arrangement is fundamentally different from a court awarded fee paid
by the losing litigant when another party prevails." 6 The Court acknowl-
edged that, while determining the appropriate market and market rate
would prove difficult and inexact, the rates charged in the private market
remained the proper inquiry. 117 Accordingly, the prevailing attorney's
109. Id. Accordingly, the Hensley Court argued that the focus should be on the signifi-
cance of the results obtained on a prevailing party's claims, thereby helping to determine if
related unsuccessful claims were justified, and therefore compensable in light of the results.
Id. at 435 & n.ll.
110. Id. As an example, the Court listed a party who sought damages but received only
injunctive relief. Id. The hours spent in an effort to recover damages may be accounted for if
obtaining injunctive relief "justified" spending time pursuing damages. Id.
111. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
112. Id. (addressing a request for attorney's fees under the Fees Awards Act by prevailing
civil rights litigants represented by a nonprofit legal aid society).
113. Id. at 893-94 (citing cases listed in the legislative history accompanying the Fees
Awards Act); see also Corson, supra note 68, at 580 (finding that Blum established the manner
in which a reasonable rate was to be calculated).
114. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n. 11; see also Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight
for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 330-
31 (1990) (explaining Blum's endorsement of a market inquiry).
115. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.ll
116. Id. "The § 1988 fee determination is made by the court in an entirely different set-
ting: there is no negotiation or even discussion with the prevailing client, as the fee-found to
be reasonable by the court-is paid by the losing party." Id. at 895-96 n. 11.
117. See id. at 896 n.11. The Court recognized that a prevailing market rate was essen-
tially an artificial inquiry given the wide variance among the skill and reputation of attorneys.
However, the Court believed that the rates charged in the private market were the best mea-
sure of this inexact determination. See id.; see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 447
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hourly rate, if consistent with the rates of similarly situated attorneys in the
private market, qualified as reasonable."
1 8
B. Further Refinement of the Lodestar: Enhancement
As in Lindy Brothers, the Hensley Court held that assessing a reasonable
fee did not end with the calculation of the lodestar." 9 The Court required
consideration of additional factors to reach a true valuation of the attorney's
services, including those factors listed by the court in Johnson. 2 0 Although
the Hensley Court recognized that the lodestar could be enhanced based on
consideration of the factors enumerated in Johnson, it cautioned that several
of those factors were consumed within the initial lodestar calculation.1
2
'
The Court, however, failed to specifically identify which factors were so con-
sumed, primarily supporting enhancement of the lodestar based on the sig-
nificance of the "'results obtained.' ,,122 In addition, Justice Brennan,
concurring in Hensley, argued that economic reality 23 demanded that
courts not stop at a calculation of the lodestar and an analysis of the results,
but rather, continue the analysis to examine the effect of contingent
payment. '
24
In Blum, the more difficult task was determining which of the Johnson
factors remained viable sources for enhancement after the lodestar figure is
calculated. 25 In considering the district court's assessment of the risk of the
undertaking, the Supreme Court balked at a definitive ruling on whether
enhancement for the contingent nature of payment was appropriate.'
2 6
(1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (endorsing the legislative history authorizing market stan-
dards as measure of a fully compensatory fee).
118. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.1 I. The Court specifically examined whether "the requested
rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation." Id.
119. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9 (holding that a district court may also consier factors in
Johnson as needed to award a reasonable fee).
120. Id. "The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the in-
quiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust the fee
upward or downward ...." Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 438-40.
123. Justice Brennan found that in the private market, economic realities demanded that
attorneys who take cases on a contingency basis charge more for assuming the risk of nonpay-
ment, thus resulting in a larger payment than if the attorney had been paid at a fixed hourly
rate. Id. at 448 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan also stated that: "Most attorneys
paid an hourly rate expect to be paid promptly and without regard to success or failure. Cus-
tomary rates reflect those expectations." Id.
124. Id. at 448-49. Justice Brennan argued that after a calculation of the lodestar, the
"prelitigation likelihood" of success should be examined to see if enhancement is necessary to
compensate for the contingent nature of payment. Id. at 449.
125. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984).
126. Id. at 901.
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Moreover, the Blum Court cast doubt on whether any upward adjustment to
the lodestar based on the risk of nonpayment would ever be necessary to
provide for a reasonable fee.127 The Court rejected enhancement based on
the novelty and complexity of the issues or claims litigated, holding that they
were subsumed within the number of billable hours expended on the ac-
tion. 128 It reasoned that the more novel and complex the issue, the more
billable hours would be required to properly address it; therefore, any en-
hancement to the lodestar based on these factors would be redundant. 129
Similarly, the significance of a particular attorney's "'quality of representa-
tion'" would normally be accounted for within the hourly rate.13
In an apparent break with the precedent set by Hensley, the Blum Court
found that acknowledgement of the results obtained would generally occur
in consideration of factors included in determining a reasonable fee.1 ' The
Court reasoned that particularly significant results would be reflected in a
greater hourly fee; therefore, any adjustment after the calculation of the
lodestar based on extraordinary results or significant class benefit would be
inappropriate. 132 Echoing Hensley, the Court concluded that enhancement
of the fee award may be justified, but only in exceptional circumstances and
only when the prevailing party can provide specific evidence showing that an
enhancement of the lodestar is necessary to reach a "fully compensatory"
award.' 33 The calculation of the lodestar was presumed to result in a rea-
sonable fee if the fee applicant met his burden of showing that the hours
expended at the rate charged were reasonable.' 34
In Blum, as in Hensley, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall in a
concurring opinion, asserted that enhancement of the lodestar based on the
127. Id. at 901 n. 17. The Court specifically reserved the question of contingency enhance-
ment. Id.
128. Id. at 900-01. The Court, however, left some leeway to consider the fact that a more
experienced and skilled attorney may spend fewer hours on a difficult or novel claim than an
attorney of average skill. In this sense, the attorney's skill may be accounted for by adjusting
the hourly fee for the attorney's services in calculating the lodestar, not by enhancing the
lodestar after the fact. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 899, 901. Some latitude for an upward adjustment is available if the services
performed and results obtained by the attorney were of an " 'exceptional' " quality above what
might "reasonably" be expected given the hourly fee charged. Id. at 899.
131. Id. at 900. "Because acknowledgment of the 'results obtained' generally will be sub-
sumed within other factors used to calculate a reasonable fee, it normally should not provide
an independent basis for increasing the fee award." Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 901-02. The fee applicants in Blum failed to produce evidence that enhance-
ment was necessary to provide for a reasonable fee. Id. Therefore, an upward adjustment of
the lodestar was found to be inappropriate. Id.
134. Id. at 897. The Court left some opportunity for rebutting the presumption of reasona-
bleness. Id.
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contingent nature of payment was an appropriate exercise of the Court's
discretion. 1 35 Pointing to cases endorsed in the legislative history of the Fees
Awards Act, Brennan argued that the market-based fee approach demanded
a consideration of the contingent nature of payment, stating that to ignore
this factor by failing to enhance either the hourly rate or the lodestar would
be inconsistent with private market rates, thereby resulting in a fee inade-
quate to attract competent counsel. 136
The strong presumption of reasonableness which Blum attached to the
product of reasonable hours and a reasonable market rate evolved into a
virtually irrebuttable presumption. 37 In Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley i),138 the Supreme Court
clearly expressed that "most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a
'reasonable' attorney's fee" are included within the lodestar figure. 1 39 In ad-
dition, the Court closed the small opening left in Blum for enhancement of
the lodestar based on the rare situation where the quality of an attorney's
representation is exceptional. " It reasoned that an attorney is presumed to
perform his duties diligently in order to obtain the best possible results;
therefore, the quality of his work is accounted for within the reasonable
number of hours expended or the reasonable hourly rate. 141 Any enhance-
ment for the quality of work would result in double counting and thus,
would be a prohibited windfall. 142 The Court concluded that the lodestar
figure, while not necessarily reflecting the exact amount an attorney could
obtain through a private fee arrangement, presumptively provides for an
amount that fulfills the purposes of the typical fee-shifting statute-allowing
an injured party to obtain counsel and seek relief for violation of certain
federal laws. 143 However, the Court, left the issue of enhancement of the
lodestar based upon the contingent nature of payment for reargument in the
135. Id. at 903 (Brennan, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 903-04. Justice Brennan specifically noted that Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64
F.R.D. 680, 685-86 (N.D. Cal. 1974), authorized consideration of the contingent nature of
payment in assessing a reasonable fee. Blum, 465 U.S. at 902-03 (Brennan, J., concurring).
137. Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. 546, 564-66 (1986). The Court noted that adjustment to
the lodestar was limited to " 'rare' 'exceptional' cases" where the record offered " 'specific
evidence' " of the necessity for enhancement. Id. at 565 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. 898-901)).
138. 478 U.S. 546 (1986) (addressing a request for attorney's fees under the Clean Air Act
by prevailing environmental litigants).
139. Id. at 566.
140. Id. at 565-66.
141. Id. "[W]hen an attorney first accepts a case and agrees to represent the client, he
obligates himself to perform to the best of his ability and to produce the best possible results
commensurate with his skill and his client's interests." Id. at 565.
142. Id. at 566.
143. Id. at 564-66.
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next term in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air
(Delaware Valley I1). 144
III. DIRECT CONFRONTATION OF ENHANCEMENT OF THE LODESTAR
BASED ON THE CONTINGENCY FACTOR
Delaware Valley I 14 revealed the dichotomy of opinions regarding the
role of contingency in the assessment of a reasonable fee.' 4 6 Three ap-
proaches were articulated: First, an exclusion of the contingency factor
based upon administrative and equitable flaws; 4 7 second, inclusion of the
contingency factor founded on congressional intent and common sense mar-
ket demands;' 4 ' and third, a hybrid of the previous two approaches, referred
to as the "substantial difficulties" test, that entailed an objective and equita-
ble response to congressional intent and the administrative difficulties inher-
ent within consideration of the contingency factor.'4 9
A plurality of the Court excluded consideration of the contingent nature
of payment and determined that the issue centered on whether the lodestar
should be enhanced because the attorney assumed a risk of not being paid. 5
After assessing the weight of various commentaries and noting conflicting
approaches among the circuits,' the plurality concluded that Congress did
144. Id. at 567. "There remains the question of upward adjustment, by way of multipliers
or enhancement of the lodestar, based on the likelihood of success, or to put it another way,
the risk of loss." Id. at 568. Again, the Court phrased the issue as an enhancement rather
than questioning whether the contingency of payment must actually go toward a calculation of
the reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 567.
145. 483 U.S. 711 (1987) (addressing the propriety of contingency enhancement of a fee
award to prevailing environmental litigants under the Clean Air Act).
146. Delaware Valley II contained three separate opinions, none of which constituted a
majority of the Court. See id. at 727, 731, 738. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, and Justices Powell and Scalia, held that contingency enhancement to the lodestar figure
was inappropriate. Id. at 727. Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment, found contingency enhancement to be consistent with congressional intent. Id at 731
(O'Connor, J. concurring). In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Stevens, believed that Congress intended to allow for an upward adjustment based
on the contingent nature of payment. Id. at 738 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 721-31.
148. Id. at 735-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 731-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 738. "The issue before us is whether, when a plaintiff prevails, its attorney
should or may be awarded separate compensation for assuming the risk of not being paid." Id.
at 715. The risk of nonpayment was determined by the risk of losing, which was measured by
the "unsettled" nature of the law and the novelty of the particular issue presented. Id. at 715-
16. Simply stated, under the plurality approach a court must ask what the chances of success
in a given case are, considering the facts, issues presented, and the state of the law.
151. Id. at 716-23. Several courts of appeals support enhancement of the lodestar to reflect
the contingent nature of payment in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Crumbaker v. Merit Sys.
Protection Bd., 781 F.2d 191, 196-97 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (refusing to enhance lodestar unless
attorney's representation deemed exceptional); Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605,
19931
Catholic University Law Review
not specifically authorize enhancement of a fee award based upon the "risk
of loss.,,1. 2 The plurality found that enhancing fees based on the risk of loss
would violate the statutory direction that only prevailing parties are entitled
to an award. 153 The plurality reasoned that the risk of loss is not a compen-
sable factor attributable to a particular case.' 54 Thus, its inclusion in an
award would, in effect, provide a fee to plaintiffs' attorneys for cases taken
on a contingency basis in which their clients did not prevail.' 55 The plural-
ity argued that if Congress would not provide a fee to a party who lost, then
it would not authorize an enhancement for the risk of loss. 156 In addition,
613-14 (1st Cir. 1985) (setting out factors to be considered in determining whether enhance-
ment based on the contingent nature of payment is appropriate); Vaughns v. Board of Educ.,
770 F.2d 1244, 1246 (4th Cir. 1985) (permitting enhancement where exceptional circum-
stances existed); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 773 F.2d 677, 683, 686 (6th Cir.
1985) (en banc) (allowing fee enhancement where the court determined that the hourly rate
and number of hours expended appeared unreasonably low given the complexity of the liti-
gated civil rights issues), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1986); Craik v. Minnesota State Univ.
Bd., 738 F.2d 348, 350-51 (8th Cir. 1984) (granting enhancement to account for attorney suc-
cess); Jones v. Central Soya Co., 748 F.2d 586, 591 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that the fact that
an attorney prevailed on all issues does not automatically entitle him to lodestar enhance-
ment); Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 712 F.2d 165, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1983) (refusing to
augment the lodestar but recognizing the possibility of enhancement under proper circum-
stances); White v. Richmond, 713 F.2d 458, 462 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming enhancement of fee
to account for attorney success); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 557-58 (10th Cir. 1983)
(establishing guidelines for an award of attorney's fees). Other courts have either disallowed
contingency enhancement in any situation or have denied such enhancement based on deficien-
cies in practical application. See, e.g., Lewis v. Coughlin, 801 F.2d 570, 576 (2d Cir. 1986)
(requiring proof that lack of availability of an upward adjustment would have made finding
counsel difficult); In re Burlington N., Inc., 810 F.2d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 821 (1987) (disfavoring the use of contingency enhancement); Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines, 746 F.2d 4, 26-29 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(discussing reasons why contingency enhancement
should not be allowed, despite its theoretical attractiveness), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021
(1985). The division among commentators mirrors the division among the courts. Some
scholars support contingency enhancement to ensure fulfillment of statutory purposes by pro-
viding compensation for fee-shifting litigation comparable to that available in the market. Ber-
ger, supra note 47, at 322-35; Rowe, supra note 47, at 676; EqualAccess, supra note 68, at 708-
11. Other writers have challenged contingency enhancement based on the difficulty of its ap-
plication. See Leubsdorf, supra note 68, at 473-513 (formulating a more manageable contin-
gency enhancement model); Corson, supra note 68, at 586-89; Kole, supra note 68, at 1104-05.
152. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. 711, 723-24 (1987). "The disagreement among the Cir-
cuits and commentators indicates that Congress has not clearly directed or authorized multi-
pliers or enhancements for assuming the risk of loss." Id. at 723. The Delaware Valley II
plurality discounts the weight of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1974), finding that while Johnson endorses an inquiry into the fee contract between the
litigant and the attorney, it does not suggest that the contingent nature of payment should be
reflected in the calculation of the reasonable fee. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 723.
153. Id. at 725.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. The plurality reasoned that enhancement based on the risk of loss would penalize
defendants with strong defenses. Id. Furthermore, the plurality noted that compensating for
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the plurality contended that in theory, every case would yield a potential
enhancement because of the ever-present uncertainty of prevailing.157 The
plurality acknowledged that some attorneys may decline to take cases be-
cause of the lack of enhancement, but that this number would be so small as
not to frustrate the policy goals of fee-shifting statutes.15 8 Citing difficulty in
administrability, along with the aforementioned inequities, the plurality held
that without some further congressional guidance, enhancement of the lode-
star to reflect the risk of loss was impermissible."5 9
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, rejected the plurality's
finding that Congress did not authorize consideration of contingency in cal-
culating a reasonable fee. 160 Her concurrence alternatively proposed the
"substantial difficulties" 1 61 test as an "objective and nonarbitrary" method
by which to assess the need for contingency enhancement.1 62 This alterna-
tive test contained two elements. First, in order to achieve a level of consis-
tency in fee awards it mandated that enhancement for contingency be based
upon the market treatment of contingency cases viewed as a class, not on
individual case risks.1 63 Second, the alternative test placed the burden on
the fee applicant to show a different market treatment of contingency cases
and to demonstrate that without compensation for the contingent nature of
payment, the applicant "'would have faced substantial difficulties in finding
counsel in the local or other relevant market.' ,,64 Even with the use of the
the risk of loss would encourage attorneys to bring riskier cases with less merit in the hopes of
a greater enhancement. Id.
157. Id. Beyond the difficulties in assessing an enhancement, the Court did not provide
any other reason for not compensating each case with a genuine risk of nonpayment for that
risk. See id.
158. Id. at 727. "It may be that without the promise of risk enhancement some lawyers
will decline to take cases; but we doubt that the bar in general will so often be unable to
respond that the goal of the fee-shifting statutes will not be achieved." Id. The plurality
defined the statutory purpose of fee-shifting as making it possible "for poor clients with good
claims to secure competent help." Id. at 730-31.
159. Id. The Delaware Valley II plurality, however, appeared to contradict itself by sug-
gesting that in exceptional cases where there is a real risk of not prevailing, the lodestar may be
enhanced, but by no more than one-third. Id. at 730. The plurality opinion rationalized that
limiting enhancement to one-third of the award would curb incentives to bring riskier, less
meritorious claims. Id. The prevailing party must present proof that lack of compensation for
the particular risk of loss would have been a significant obstacle to finding counsel. Id. at 731.
The prevailing party in Delaware Valley II presented no such proof. Id.
160. Id. at 731 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citing the Delaware
Valley II concurrence as establishing the substantial difficulties test), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1290 (1992).
162. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 732 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
163. Id. at 732-33.
164. Id. at 733. Justice O'Connor's support of the proposition that contingency of pay-
ment affects the reasonable hourly rate is exemplified by her use of the market to determine the
treatment of contingent cases. Id.; see also City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2648
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substantial difficulties framework, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that bas-
ing fee enhancement on the riskiness of a particular case, viewed from a pre-
litigation perspective, would be unworkable and would create the kind of
administrative and equitable difficulties alluded to by the plurality. 165 Jus-
tice O'Connor sided with the plurality in endorsing the lodestar as presump-
tively reasonable,' 66 arguing that the legal risks and the novelty of the issues
of a particular case are reflected within the lodestar figure, thereby negating
the need for enhancement. 167
Justice Blackmun's dissent stressed the significance of specific congres-
sional authorization for contingency enhancement in the legislative history
accompanying the Fees Awards Act.16' Furthermore, the dissent chided the
plurality for its lack of common sense in refusing to acknowledge that con-
tingency enhancement is essential to the accomplishment of the statutory
purpose of fee-shifting provisions. 169 It argued that the proper issue to con-
sider when calculating a contingency enhancement is not the risk associated
with a particular case or the chance of succeeding, but rather, how contin-
gent cases as a whole are compensated in the market. 170 The dissent empha-
sized that the plurality's decision to eliminate consideration of the
contingent nature of payment would result in a fee award below that avail-
able in the relevant market, thereby making fee-shifting litigation less attrac-
tive. 17 ' Furthermore, the dissent criticized the plurality for disregarding
Supreme Court precedent and congressional history requiring that a reason-
(1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In her view, however, the adjustment calculated by the
Court can not exceed the amount necessary to attract competent counsel. Delaware Valley II,
483 U.S. at 733.
165. Id at 731.
166. Id.
167. Id. Justice O'Connor reasoned that because the lodestar accounted for difficulties
overcome in a particular case within the reasonable hours expended and for the skill of an
attorney in overcoming these difficulties in the reasonable hourly rate, any additional enhance-
ment for these factors would create a windfall. Id. at 734.
168. Id. at 735-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's dissent was joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
169. Id. The dissent stated:
Today, a plurality of the Court ignores the fact that a fee that may be appropriate in
amount when paid promptly and regardless of the outcome of the case, may be inade-
quate and inappropriate when its payment is contingent upon winning the case. By
not allowing an upward adjustment for a case taken on a contingent basis, the plural-
ity undermines the basic purpose of statutory attorney fees ....
Id. at 735.
170. Id. at 745-46.
171. Id. at 742. The dissent reasoned that competent counsel would not take time away
from more lucrative private practice for such litigation. As a result, the dissent argued that
those attorneys who would be attracted would be "less than fully employed or... less capa-
ble." Id. at 743.
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able fee reflect the rates prevailing in the market.172 Therefore, the dissent
argued that a court's guide to fee assessment is simply to provide an en-
hancement such that the award for a case taken on contingency is "competi-
tive" with an award in the private market. '73 Hence, the enhancement could
be accounted for by an adjustment to the reasonable hours or by an enhance-
ment of the entire lodestar figure. 174 In conclusion, the dissent took solace
in the fact that contingency enhancement in selected cases was still approved
by a majority of the Court.' 7"
The Supreme Court's failure to reach a clear majority on the issue in Dela-
ware Valley II caused confusion in the lower courts as to the role of the
contingent nature of payment in the calculation of a reasonable attorney's
fee. 176 Due to conflicting interpretations and analyses, the Supreme Court
was forced to address the issue of contingency enhancement again in City of
Burlington v. Dague and was finally able to reach a definitive majority. 177
172. Id. Justice Blackmun argued that contingency enhancement was necessary for two
reasons. First, to comply with the Court's position that statutory fees must be competitive
with those available in the private market, and second, to comply with the requirements of the
congressional purpose that fee awards attract competent counsel. Id.
173. Id. at 753. The dissent recognized that mirroring market treatment would not be
exact. Id. Unlike Justice O'Connor's concurrence, however, the dissent did not require any
special showing that the fee applicant would have faced substantial difficulty in obtaining
counsel barring contingency enhancement. Id. at 747. "[A] court's job simply will be to deter-
mine whether a case was taken on a contingent basis, whether the attorney was able to mitigate
the risk of nonpayment in any way, and whether other economic risks were aggravated by the
contingency of payment." Id. The dissent and concurrence also diverged on the opportunity
for enhancement for extra case-specific risks in the "exceptional" case; the dissent approved of
such enhancement. Id. at 748-51.
174. Id. at 753.
175. Id. at 755.
176. See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc) (finding no prece-
dential guidance on how to determine the statutory fee award in Delaware Valley II), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1290 (1992). For example, in King, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia rejected the Circuit's former approval of Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence in Delaware Valley II. Id. at 771. Instead, the D.C. Circuit found the plurality's posi-
tion to be controlling on the issue of contingency enhancement. Id. On the other hand, in
Friends of the Earth v. Eastman Kodak Co., 834 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1987), the Second Circuit
attached no weight to the Supreme Court's decision in Delaware Valley II, contending that the
Court had failed to reach a clear majority. Id. at 298; see also Dague v. City of Burlington,
935 F.2d 1343, 1359 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that due to the outcome of Delaware Valley II, the
contingency issue was open and subject to Second Circuit precedent), rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct.
2638 (1992). As a result, the Second Circuit held that the issue was still open and subject to
interpretation by circuit precedent. Friends of the Earth, 834 F.2d at 298 (adopting an ap-
proach similar to the common ground between the Delaware Valley II concurrence and plural-
ity). The inquiry authorized in Friends of the Earth was whether " '[w]ithout the possibility of
a fee enhancement . . . competent counsel might refuse to represent [environmental] clients
thereby denying them effective access to the courts.' " Id. at 298 (quoting Lewis v. Coughlin,
801 F.2d 570, 576 (2d Cir. 1986)).
177. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
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IV. CITY OF BURLINGTON v DAGUE: THE SUPREME COURT REJECTS
ENHANCEMENT FOR CONTINGENCY
In City of Burlington v. Dague,17 8 the United States Supreme Court held
that enhancement of the lodestar to reflect that the prevailing party's attor-
ney was retained on a contingency basis is not permitted under the typical
fee-shifting statute. 179 Furthermore, Justice Scalia's majority opinion criti-
cized and rejected the substantial difficulties test formulated by Justice
O'Connor in Delaware Valley II, because of flaws in its application, holding
that consideration of the contingent nature of payment is not required or
needed to provide for a reasonable fee.180 In dissent, Justice Blackmun dis-
agreed, arguing that both Supreme Court precedent and congressional au-
thorization mandate that the contingent nature of payment be accounted for
in order to assess a reasonable fee. 81 Moreover, the dissent contended that
compensation for contingency is an essential incentive for attorneys to
choose fee-shifting litigation, effectuating the purpose of fee-shifting statutes
in general.'8 2 The primary dispute dividing the majority and the dissent was
not so much the means by which contingency enhancement would be calcu-
lated into an award, but whether contingency may be a factor in determining
an award at all.1
8 3
A. The Majority Opinion: Contingency is Not an Appropriate Factor
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and held that the contingent nature of pay-
ment is not an appropriate factor in calculating a fee award.' 84 The majority
began with an examination of respondent Dague's contention that a reason-
able fee award for attorneys whose payment is contingent on success, re-
quires enhancement of the lodestar to reflect the risk of nonpayment and
mirror the additional charge an attorney in the private market would ex-
pect. 83 The Court, however, emphasized that an enhancement for contin-
gency would duplicate factors already accounted for in the lodestar." 6 The
majority divided the assessment of contingency into two factors: "(1) the
178. Id
179. Id. at 2643-44.
180. Id. at 2642-44.
181. Id. at 2644 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2648.
183. Id. at 2644. Another important issue dividing the majority and dissent involved defin-
ing contingency and the means by which it is accounted for in a fee award. Id. at 2644-47.
184. Id. at 2643-44. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas joined Justice Scalia's opinion. Id. at 2638.
185. Id. at 2641.
186. Id. The majority rejected the respondent's argument, pointing to the lodestar as the
"guiding light" of the Court's fee-shifting analysis. Id.
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legal and factual merits of the claim, and (2) the difficulty of establishing
those merits."' 187 The majority asserted that the second factor is already
accounted for in either the reasonable number of hours expended or the rea-
sonable hourly fee.' 8 8 The Court also contended that the first factor, while
not accounted for in the lodestar, should be excluded from the calculation
because it would place excessive demands on courts in contingent-fee cases
and encourage attorneys to bring frivolous claims in the hope of obtaining a
large fee award. 8 9
The Court then rejected the argument that Justice O'Connor's substantial
difficulties analysis in Delaware Valley II was controlling."9° The majority
found it impossible to determine if a party would have faced substantial diffi-
culties in finding counsel without enhancement for contingency because such
difficulties are determined by the riskiness of the case. 19 1 Because Justice
O'Connor's approach did not provide for the consideration of individual
case risks, the majority found that the analysis defied application.' 92 Fur-
thermore, treating contingent cases as a class and providing enhancement
consistent with the market treatment of that class would be circular because
the court would be turning to a market that it had created through prior
awards.'93 In addition, this type of treatment would be imperfect because it
would result in overcompensation of cases with less risk than the class aver-
age. 194 Barring the approach of Justice O'Connor's Delaware Valley II con-
currence, the Court found no other method by which contingency
enhancement could be limited to less than all contingent-fee cases.195
187. Id.
188. Id. The majority argued that accounting for the difficulty of the task or novelty of the
issues after calculating the lodestar would result in a "double counting" of the lodestar and
thus a prohibited windfall in the fee award. Id.
189. Id. at 2641-42. The majority contended that to require courts to assess the merits
factor would result in an endless lodestar inquiry. Id. Supporting the exclusion of contin-
gency, the majority reiterated the Court's position in Delaware Valley I, that fee-shifting stat-
utes" 'were not designed as a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of lawyers.'"
Id. (quoting Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986)). The majority noted, however, that
the merits factor was the principal determinant of contingent risk: "As discussed above, the
contingent risk of a case (and hence the difficulty of getting contingent-fee lawyers to take it)
depends principally upon its particular merits." Id. at 2642.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. The majority stated that the primary reason it could not support the approach of
the Delaware Valley II concurrence was that they could "not see how it can intelligibly be
applied." Id. at 2642.
193. Id. at 2643.
194. Id. The Court failed to note that the converse could also be true because cases with
less than the class average risk would be under-compensated.
195. Id.
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Finally, the majority examined the reasons supporting the exclusion of
contingency from the calculation of a reasonable fee. The Court pointed to
the prevailing party language in fee-shifting statutes as excluding recovery
for unsuccessful claims. 196 Given that attorneys attempt to offset the risk of
not prevailing through a contingent-fee arrangement, thus pooling the risks
of a group of cases so as to lessen the financial risk, the majority argued that
compensation for the contingent nature of payment in a particular case
would, in effect, compensate an attorney for unsuccessful cases in which
their client did not prevail. '97 Furthermore, the majority noted that because
the Court had already rejected the contingent-fee model' 98 in favor of the
lodestar model,'99 linking contingency enhancement with the lodestar
method would be inconsistent with that rejection and unnecessary for calcu-
lating a reasonable fee. 2 1o In the interest of administrability, the Court re-
jected contingency enhancement because it would prolong litigation and
increase the difficulty and uncertainty of calculating the fee award.2°' Ac-
cordingly, the majority adopted the plurality approach of Delaware Valley II
and prohibited contingency enhancement under fee-shifting statutes.2 °2
196. Id. The majority noted that:
An attorney operating on a contingency-fee basis pools the risks presented by his
various cases: cases that turn out to be successful pay for the time he gambled on
those that did not. To award a contingency enhancement under a fee-shifting statute
would in effect pay for the attorney's time (or anticipated time) in cases where his
client does not prevail.
Id. (emphasis in original).
197. Id.
198. The contingent-fee model calculates a fee award based on a percentage of the total
damages. It is the primary system employed in the private market to set a fee in cases where
the client is not obligated to pay throughout the course of the litigation. See Leubsdorf, supra
note 68, at 475-77 (explaining the contingent-fee model and the calculation of a fee "as a
percentage of the total recovery"); Corson, supra note 68, at 586-87 (emphasizing the preva-
lence of contingent-fees in the private market whereby fees are taken from resulting damage
awards); see also Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1990) (discussing the difference
between the Fees Awards Act and the contingent-fee model, which is based upon a percentage
recovery of total damages awarded); Kole, supra note 68, at 1099 (explaining that an attorney
in a private contingency arrangement is paid based upon the extent of success). The majority
argued that combining the contingency method, which calculated an attorney's fee based on a
percentage of recovery, with the lodestar method, which calculated the fee based on the prod-
uct of the number of hours expended and a reasonable hourly rate, would be inconsistent.
Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643.
199. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (endorsing the lodestar approach
for calculating a fee award); supra note 13 (explaining the lodestar method).
200. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643 (citing Venegas, 495 U.S. at 87).
201. Id. "Contingency enhancement would make the setting of fees more complex and
arbitrary, hence more unpredictable, and hence more litigable." Id.
202. Id. at 2643-44. The majority summarized its position by stating that "[i]t is neither
necessary nor even possible for application of the fee-shifting statutes to mimic the intricacies
of the fee-paying market in every respect." Id. at 2643.
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B. The Dissenting Opinions: A Reasonable Fee May
Include Contingency Enhancement
In his dissent,2 °3 Justice Blackmun argued that consideration of the con-
tingency factor when calculating a fee award followed "ineluctably" from an
analysis of the Court's fee-award precedent. 2" Justice Blackmun reasoned
that for a fee to be fully compensatory and thus reasonable, it must include
compensation for the contingent nature of payment, a legitimate market
factor.20 5 Justice Blackmun believed that the majority's holding to the con-
trary violated the affirmed purpose of fee-shifting statutes and undermined
enforcement of the statutory schemes for which Congress authorized fee-
shifting.20 6 In addition, Justice Blackmun adopted Justice O'Connor's sub-
stantial difficulties approach articulated in Delaware Valley 11.207 Accord-
ingly, Justice Blackmun argued that an enhancement should be calculated
based on the market treatment of contingency cases, and that such a deter-
mination would control future court rulings for cases in the same market.20 8
Justice Blackmun concluded that this analysis would provide for objective
203. Id. at 2644 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's dissent was joined by Jus-
tice Stevens. Id.
204. Id. The dissent founded its conclusion on two principles. First, for a fee to qualify as
reasonable it must be "'fully compensatory,' " id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 435 (1983), and based upon "'rates and practices prevailing in the relevant private mar-
ket.' " Id. (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 286 (1989). Second, in the private
market an attorney whose payment is contingent upon success charges a greater fee than if he
was guaranteed payment. Id. at 2644-45 (citations omitted).
205. Id. Justice Blackmun argued that in the private market it costs more to bring a case
when payment is not guaranteed, therefore a client must pay more. His dissent argued that
this fundamental reality should be reflected in the reasonable fee award. Id.
206. Id. Justice Blackmun contended that in the majority of actions brought under stat-
utes authorizing fee-shifting, plaintiffs will not have the funds to retain an attorney other than
on a contingent basis. Id. Therefore, eliminating compensation for contingency from an
award would discourage attorneys from taking on such litigation when the private market will
provide security from such a risk. Thus, the majority's decision strikes at the core group of
citizens Congress sought to reach with fee-shifting language. Id.; see also supra notes 75-82
and accompanying text (discussing Congress's intent in fee-shifting statutes). In addition, Jus-
tice Blackmun reiterated his position in Delaware Valley H that the risk to be compensated is
not the riskiness or merit of the particular case, but rather the risk of nonpayment associated
with contingent cases as a whole. Id. at 2645; Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. 711, 745-47
(1987).
207. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2645-47; Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. at 731-34.
208. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2646. Consistent with the substantial difficulties test, Justice
Blackmun found that a fee applicant must put forth evidence that a different treatment occurs.
Id. This requirement clearly aligned the dissent with Justice O'Connor's position in Delaware
Valley I. See id. Justice O'Connor did not join Justice Blackmun's dissent in Dague, how-
ever, because the respondents in Dague did not present "market-specific support for the 25%
enhancement figure." Id. at 2649 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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and less arbitrary awards consistent with the effectuation of the purpose of
fee-shifting statutes.2"
Justice Blackmun also discredited the majority's argument that contin-
gency enhancement was inconsistent with the authorization of fee-shifting
statutes in general. He posited that the majority's position resulted from a
lack of attention to and understanding of general fee-shifting language and
the contingency issue as a whole. 210 The prevailing party limitation provides
for an award to the party, not to the attorney.211 Therefore, an award based
upon a contingency enhancement does not, as the majority argued, result in
an award to a party who did not prevail.21 2 Justice Blackmun argued that
the real issue troubling the majority was that an award enhanced for contin-
gency would be "excessive," not that nonprevailing parties would be
awarded fees.213 In addition, Justice Blackmun attacked the majority for
rejecting the treatment of contingent cases as a class. Looking to market
treatment of contingent cases to determine if a fee should be enhanced is
consistent with the fact that the Court must look to a private market to
determine the reasonable hourly rate.2" 4 Justice Blackmun argued further
that since no claim is guaranteed to succeed, the market reflects that an
attorney will prefer an uncertain case with a guaranteed fee to an uncertain
case in which payment is contingent. 215 An award calculated as if the fee
were guaranteed, disallowing enhancement, would frustrate congressional
purpose because fee-shifting statutes are aimed at eliminating this
preference.21 6
209. Id. at 2646 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
210. Id. Justice Blackmun specifically cited the majority's "inattention" to the statutory
language and to a confusion of the "two meanings" of contingency. Id. Justice Blackmun
contended that the majority was shaping the issue to indicate that the fee applicant desired a
system in which a fee award would be based on a percentage of the total recovery, when in
reality he was simply proposing that the risk of nonpayment be accounted for in the fee award.
Id. at 2646-47.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2646. Justice Blackmun's dissent asserted that the "threshold" inquiry con-
cerned whether the fee applicant "prevailed." Only then did an inquiry into the size of the fee
award ensue. Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). While the lodestar
model has replaced the contingent-fee model, the dissent found that the respondents were not
arguing for a return to the contingent-fee model of a percentage of recovery, but rather, for the
lodestar to reflect the contingent nature of payment. Id.; see also supra note 210.
214. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2647.
215. Id. "Even the least meritorious case in which the attorney is guaranteed compensa-
tion whether he wins or loses will be economically preferable to the most meritorious fee-
bearing claim in which the attorney will be paid only if he prevails .... " Id. (emphasis in
original).
216. Id. at 2647-48.
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Justice O'Connor wrote a separate dissenting opinion to reaffirm her ap-
proach set out in Delaware Valley II and to underscore the dissent's criti-
cism of the majority's misinterpretation of the "market-based" analysis.217
Justice O'Connor endorsed the lodestar, but contended that it must also pro-
vide incentive for attorneys to choose cases in which payment is contin-
gent.218 She argued that contingency enhancement would provide this in-
centive and must be available to "'attract competent counsel.' v9219
V. THE STATUS OF FEE-SHIFTING AFTER DAGUE
The Supreme Court's fee-shifting jurisprudence is informed by the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 and the extensive legislative
history accompanying the Act.220 In Dague, the Court's ruling ignors the
legislative guidance of Congress and the Court's own fee-shifting precedent
by holding that it is unnecessary to account for the risk of loss when calcu-
lating a reasonable fee.221 Although the Court acknowledges that this factor
is an essential element of private sector fee calculation that is not fully ac-
counted for in the lodestar,2 22 it refuses to take the necessary step, which
Congress essentially took for it, to find that in appropriate cases, the contin-
gent nature of payment must be accounted for when calculating a reasonable
fee. This position not only discounts an important factor in the private mar-
217. Id. at 2648 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
218. Id.
219. Id. "I continue to be of the view that in certain circumstances a 'reasonable' attor-
ney's fee should not be computed by the purely retrospective lodestar figure, but also must
incorporate a reasonable incentive to an attorney contemplating whether or not to take the
case in the first place." Id.
220. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretations of the
Fees Awards Act).
221. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text. The majority's dismissal of the in-
struction provided by the legislative history is not surprising given Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion in Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989), a case interpreting the Fees Awards
Act. In rejecting the importance of the Fees Awards Act's legislative history, Justice Scalia
stated:
Congress is elected to enact statutes rather than point to cases, and its Members
have better uses for their time than poring over District Court opinions .... [T]he
references to the cases were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his or
her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a
lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not primarily to inform the
Members of Congress what the bill meant ... but rather to influence judicial con-
struction. What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her
citation of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of the land,
thereafter dutifully to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.
I decline to participate in this process.
Id. at 98-99 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
222. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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ket, but also violates the principle that in setting a reasonable fee the Court
must look to the fee practices prevailing in the private market.223
A. Congressional Endorsement of the Contingent Nature of Payment
The Dague majority pays little attention to the guidance of the legislative
history accompanying the Fees Awards Act.224 While, the language of the
statute does not specifically endorse the principle of contingency enhance-
ment, Congress instructed that the contingent nature of payment be consid-
ered within the contemplation of a reasonable fee. 225 Congress's citation
of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 226 and Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher227 is indicative of this intent.228
In Stanford Daily, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California held that enhancement of the base fee based on the contin-
gent nature of payment is appropriate. 229 The court explains that the
principle of contingency enhancement "simply suggests that the contingent
nature of compensation be considered in assessing the reasonableness of any
fee.",230 Similarly, in Johnson, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit cites the "fixed or contingent" nature of the fee arrangement as
a factor to be considered in determining whether a fee award is reason-
able. 231' The holdings in these two cases are consistent with the general pur-
pose of fee-shifting statutes and Congress's guidance that fee awards should
represent what counsel would receive from a fee-paying client.232 This legis-
lative guidance, combined with Justice Blackmun's common sense dissent
223. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 210 and accompanying text; see also West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v.
Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1146-47 (1991) (expressing preference for adhering to the plain lan-
guage of the Fees Awards Act rather than alter the meaning by "the statements of individual
legislators or committees during the course of the enactment process"). Justice Scalia's rejec-
tion of legislative history explains the lack of weight he attaches to congressional instruction
on fee-shifting. In fact, in Blanchard, Justice Scalia commented that it was his position that
the Court had "acknowledged [its] emancipation from Johnson," and that legislative history
was "unreliable evidence of what the voting Members of Congress actually had in mind."
Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
225. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913;
supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
226. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
227. 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
228. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913 (citing
Johnson, 488 F.2d at 714; Stanford Daily, 64 F.R.D. at 680).
229. Stanford Daily, 64 F.R.D. at 687-88.
230. Id. at 686.
231. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 69-82. But see Kole, supra note 68, at 1086-87
(arguing that the language of the Fees Awards Act is "ambiguous" on whether the enhance-
ment based on the contingent nature of payment is acceptable).
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explaining the market-based motivations of attorneys,233 clearly supports the
proposition that the contingent nature of payment must be considered in
some form in order to calculate a reasonable fee.234
B. Calculating a Fee Award: The Lodestar and Contingency
The Dague majority attempts to respond to the arguments supporting en-
hancement based on the contingent nature of payment by suggesting that
contingency is already accounted for in the lodestar.235 The majority recog-
nizes that its two-part breakdown of contingency imperfectly accounts for
the contingent nature of payment because only one part, the difficulty of
establishing the merits of a particular case, is be accounted for in the lodestar
(either in increased hours, or in an increased hourly fee).236 In addition, the
correctness of the Court's contingency breakdown is questionable in the con-
text of Blum v. Stenson S237 separate consideration of the propriety of en-
hancement based on "the novelty and complexity of the issues ' 2 38 in a case,
the "quality of representation, "239 and on the "risk of nonpayment. ' 21 If
the contingent nature of payment were simply derived from the difficulty of
the issues in a particular case (the novelty and complexity of the issues), and
the skill required to resolve the issues (the quality of representation), as the
majority suggests,2 thn the Blum Court would not have had cause to con-
sider the risk of nonpayment separately.242 Furthermore, given the Court's
holding in Blum recognizing that both the novelty and complexity of the
issues and the quality of representation are accounted for in the lodestar, the
233. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
234. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2644 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In his dissent Justice Blackmun stated: "If a statutory fee consistent with market practices is
'reasonable,' and if in the private market an attorney who assumes the risk of nonpayment can
expect additional compensation, then it follows that a statutory fee may include additional
compensation for contingency and still qualify as reasonable." Id.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 184-89. The majority itself only half-heartedly
suggested that the contingent nature of payment was reflected in the lodestar figure, stating
that contingency "would likely" be included. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641.
236. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641.
237. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
238. Id. at 898.
239. Id. at 899.
240. Id. at 901; see also supra text accompanying notes 116-27.
241. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641. "The [difficulty of establishing the merits] is ordinarily
reflected in the lodestar-either in the higher number of hours expended to overcome the
difficulty, or in the higher hourly rate of the attorney skilled and experienced enough to do so."
Id.
242. Blum, 465 U.S. at 900-01; see supra notes 105-44 and accompanying text (explaining
the lodestar calculation).
19931
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Court would not have considered the contingency issue anew in Delaware
Valley II if it were truly composed of solely these two factors.243
In addition, the lodestar analysis detailed in Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc.
v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary 244 and adopted by the Court in
Hensley v. Eckerhart,245 specifically authorizes separate consideration of the
contingent nature of payment to determine whether enhancement of the
lodestar figure is necessary.246 Hensley, while restricting the occasions for
lodestar enhancement, leaves open consideration of the contingent nature of
payment by specifically referencing enhancement based on the factors listed
in Johnson in order to fulfill the purpose of the Fees Awards Act.24 7 Fur-
thermore, Blum reasserts the principle set forth in Hensley, that enhance-
ment of the lodestar is appropriate in rare circumstances that demand it for
determining a reasonable fee.248 The Dague Court's failure to include the
contingent nature of payment within those factors accounted for in the lode-
star, coupled with the Court's acceptance of the principle of lodestar en-
hancement, support the proposition that the contingent nature of payment is
not accounted for within the lodestar and may require enhancement of the
lodestar in order to calculate a reasonable fee.249
The majority's recognition of the deficiencies in its lodestar inclusion
argument motivate it to suggest that the ultimate basis for excluding consid-
eration of the contingent nature of payment is that lodestar enhancement
based on this factor would be burdensome and difficult, if not impossible to
accomplish in any viable manner.25" This argument simply amounts to an
unacceptable admission that the contingent nature of payment, while a legit-
243. Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. 711 (1987); see supra text accompanying notes 135-66.
244. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
245. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 100-10.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 119-26. "The product of reasonable hours times a
reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the
district court to adjust the fee upward or downward .... " Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
248. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 901 (1984). "We therefore reject petitioner's argu-
ment that an upward adjustment to an attorney's fee is never appropriate .... " Id.; see supra
text accompanying notes 125-36.
249. See supra note 247. In his dissent, Justice.Blackmun noted that the Court's refusal to
acknowledge contingency enhancement "violates the principles we have applied consistently in
prior cases." City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2358, 2644 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
250. See supra notes 240-42 (explaining the Court's recognition of the deficiencies of its
lodestar inclusion argument). "Contingency enhancement would make the setting of fees more
complex and arbitrary, hence more unpredictable, and hence more litigable." Dague, 112 S.
Ct. at 2643.
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imate source for enhancement, is not accounted for because of the difficulty
of the task.251
C. The Substantial Difficulties Test: A Cure for Administrative Difficulty
The substantial difficulties test, outlined by Justice O'Connor in Delaware
Valley JJ,252 is a viable method through which the contingent nature of pay-
ment may be factored into a fee award.25 a If the fee applicant can affirma-
tively prove that the absence of contingency enhancement would have been
an obstacle to obtaining competent counsel, then compensation for contin-
gency is appropriate.254 Such an analysis correctly looks to the prevailing
practice in the market, as the Dague dissents note, provides incentives for
attorneys to take statutory fee cases, fulfilling the purpose of fee-shifting stat-
utes, and is readily administrable by the Court.255
While enhancement for contingency may be more burdensome than the
simple lodestar calculation, congressional purpose indicates that it is re-
quired.256 Frustration of this purpose will clearly invite response from Con-
gress to rectify the Court's ruling,257 paticularly given its severe under-
cutting of the enforcement provisions of several environmental and civil
rights laws.258 The substantial difficulties test would answer the burdens of
administration and fulfill the purpose of fee-shifting statutes.259
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court's adoption of the lodestar method in Hensley for
calculating attorney's fee awards, the appropriateness and/or availability of
251. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641. "The first factor (relative merits of the claim) is not re-
flected in the lodestar, but there are good reasons why it should play no part in the calculation
of the award." Id. As Justice O'Connor noted in her separate dissent, "the Court has never
suggested that the difficulty of the task or possible inexactitude of the result justifies forgoing
those calculations altogether." Id. at 2648 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
252. 483 U.S. 711, 731 (1987).
253. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text; see also Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2647
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). "[I]f Justice O'CONNOR's standard were adopted, the matter of
the amount by which fees should be increased would quickly become settled in the various
district courts and courts of appeals for the different kinds of federal litigation." Id.
254. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2648; see also supra notes 156-64.
255. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2644-49; see also supra note 250 and notes 160-62 and accompa-
nying text.
256. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
257. See Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2645 n.4 (noting the specific congressional prohibition on
bonuses and multipliers in calculation of fee awards under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(C) (1988)).
258. Id. at 2648 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Congress intended the fee-shifting statutes to
serve as an integral enforcement mechanism in a variety of federal statutes-most notably,
civil rights and environmental statutes." Id.; see also supra notes 75-82 and accompanying
text.
259. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
1993]
Catholic University Law Review
enhancement for the contingent nature of payment has been unclear. This
uncertainty stems in part from the difficulty the Court has faced in recon-
ciling Congress's endorsement of contingency enhancement with the admin-
istrative difficulties associated with such a calculation. Compounding this
difficulty are the divergent views as to what such an enhancement reflects,
and how to determine the degree to which it should be reflected. In its most
basic form, the question revolves around whether the risks inherent in a par-
ticular case drive the inquiry or whether the uncertainty of payment stand-
ing alone supports enhancement in a given market regardless of the actual
risk that nonpayment would occur. Rather than definitively resolving these
difficulties, Delaware Valley I sharpened these distinctions among the mem-
bers of the Court, leaving the law unsettled.
Unfortunately, the definitive answer that came in Dague, rejecting consid-
eration of the contingent nature of payment, is a response to the difficulty of
the issue rather than to the policy demands of fee-shifting statutes. In order
to comply with the purpose of fee-shifting statutes, as defined by Congress,
compensation for the risk of nonpayment must be available. The difficulty in
formulating an equitable, nonarbitrary assessment should not be a bar to its
inclusion. The Dague Court disallows the inquiry because of the administra-
tive burden of the task. The majority opinion devalues the market test estab-
lished in Blum, and discounts the guidance of the legislative history of the
Fees Awards Act regarding consideration of the contingent nature of pay-
ment. While the Court should strive for a uniform method of fee calcula-
tion, this goal should not result in the elimination of factors necessary to
award a fee that puts statutory fee cases on the same level with private ac-
tions. By refusing to consider the contingent nature of payment, the Court
in Dague undercut the effectiveness and enforcement of those statutory
schemes incorporating fee-shifting provisions. In so doing, the Court guts
the incentive for private prosecution, thus inviting a congressional response
to revitalize fee-shifting policy. The private market compensates for the con-
tingent nature of payment; a statutory fee award must make this option
available as well.
Brian Albert Davis
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